Luis Alberto Bustamante Robin; Jose Guillermo Gonzalez Cornejo; Jennifer Angelica Ponce Ponce; Francia Carolina Vera Valdes; Carolina Ivonne Reyes Candia; Mario Alberto Correa Manríquez; Enrique Alejandro Valenzuela Erazo; Gardo Francisco Valencia Avaria; Alvaro Gonzalo Andaur Medina; Carla Veronica Barrientos Melendez; Luis Alberto Cortes Aguilera; Ricardo Adolfo Price Toro; Julio César Gil Saladrina; Ivette Renee Mourguet Besoain; Marcelo Andres Oyarse Reyes; Franco Gonzalez Fortunatti; Patricio Ernesto Hernández Jara; Demetrio Protopsaltis Palma; Paula Flores Vargas; Ricardo Matias Heredia Sanchez; Alamiro Fernandez Acevedo; Soledad García Nannig; Katherine Alejandra Lafoy Guzmán;
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The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE That was the kind of authority that I had
mind when putting the proposition of the common law to you. If
lat is right it establishes it at common law against you.
Mr. SULLIVAN If it is right it is put not as a statement of the mmon law but as a statement on the statute.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE^ That may be only arguing in a circle; lere you, at any rate, have authority for saying the statute of
Iward in 1351 was merely to declare the common law, because there
some doubt about it.
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JEFE JUSTICIA DEL SEÑOR Ese fue el tipo de autoridad que tenía
importa cuando te propongas la ley común. Silat tiene razón, lo establece en el derecho consuetudinario contra usted. Sr. SULLIVAN Si es correcto, no se pone como una declaración del ) mmon law pero como una declaración sobre el estatuto. JEFE DE JUSTICIA DEL SEÑOR ^ Eso puede ser solo discutir en un círculo; en cualquier caso, tiene autoridad para decir el estatuto de Iward en 1351 fue simplemente declarar la ley común, porque all alguna duda al respecto. |
Mr. SULLIVAN It is a circle.
fhe LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I have come across somewhere in the read-
ig for the purpose of this case, I think it is Sir John Campbell, when
i-ttorney-General, said the statute was passed to get rid of that miserable
J of things, and that is why the statute of Edward III. was passed.
Mr. SULLIVAN Though in a circle, I submit, so far from weakening
my argument, that strengthens my argument. If you find cited, whether
you call it under the statute or by common law, authorities for a pro-
position applying to the statute, that is strong evidence that if the
authorities are, in fact, mistaken as to the basis of decision, and there
never has been a decision upon it, that then your lordships will have
to construe not the common law but the statute in the terms of the
declaration as representing whatever the true meaning of those terms
may be, the common law anterior to it. Now, my lords, I was passing
to the bottom of page 168, unless the Attorney-General wishes me to
read any more.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL No, I wanted that paragraph which sug-
gested what my lord said. I think at the top of page 168 you have
Weston's case.
" delivering up the estate of Oughtrewicke, and John de Gomenys for
" delivering up the Castle of Ardes, in France, both of which were im-
" peached by the Commons, and had judgment of the Lords in Parlia-
"ment."
Mr. JUSTICES HORRIDGEI Are these the cases you gave under the items 1 |
Sr. SULLIVAN Es un círculo.
"entregando el patrimonio de Oughtrewicke y John de Gomenys paraSEÑOR JUSTICIA PRINCIPAL que he encontrado en algún lugar de la lectura. A los efectos de este caso, creo que es Sir John Campbell, cuando i-ttorney-General, dijo que el estatuto fue aprobado para deshacerse de ese miserable J de las cosas, y es por eso que el estatuto de Eduardo III. fue aprobada. Sr. SULLIVAN Aunque en un círculo, lo presento, lejos de debilitarse. mi argumento, eso fortalece mi argumento. Si encuentra citado, si lo llamas bajo el estatuto o por el derecho consuetudinario, las autoridades para un pro posición que se aplica al estatuto, que es una fuerte evidencia de que si el las autoridades están, de hecho, equivocadas en cuanto a la base de la decisión, y hay nunca ha sido una decisión al respecto, que entonces sus señorías tendrán para interpretar no el derecho consuetudinario sino el estatuto en los términos del declaración que representa cualquiera que sea el verdadero significado de esos términos puede ser, la ley común anterior a ella. Ahora, mis señores, estaba pasando al final de la página 168, a menos que el Fiscal General lo desee leer más El ABOGADO GENERAL No, quería ese párrafo que sugiera Gesto lo que dijo mi señor. Creo que en la parte superior de la página 168 tienes El caso de Weston. Sr. SULLIVAN Sí. "Este fue el caso de William Weston para "entregando el Castillo de Ardes, en Francia, los cuales fueron im- "Peaches por los Comunes, y tenía el juicio de los Lores en Parlia- "ment". Sr. JUSTICES HORRIDGEI ¿Son estos los casos que dio bajo los ítems 1 |
Mr. SULLIVAN No; this is a new case cited by him, the 1
Richard II., No. 40. William de Weston was to be drawn and hanged,
but execution was respited; and execution was respited in the second
case. Then: " And note, though the charge were treason, and possibly
" the proofs might probably amount to it, and Walsingham, sub anno 1
" Richard II., tells us it was done by treason; yet the reason expressed in
" the judgment against Weston is only " then he quotes the judgment,
and he says, passing on to the passage I wished to approach, " The
(l truth is, if it were delivered up by bribery or treachery, it might be
" treason, but if delivered up upon cowardice or imprudence without
" treachery " purely upon the suggestion I made, it was an inquiry
into the method of the delivery of the castle " though it were an offence
" against the laws of war, and the party subject to a sentence of death by
" martial law, as it once happened in a case of the like nature in the late
" times of trouble, yet it is not treason by the common law, unless it was
" done by treachery; but though this sentence was given in terrorem,
' ' yet it was not executed : it iseems to be a kind of military sentence, though
" given in Parliament." That is the passage I wished to refer to.
Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE; That is a very strong line, that it would not
be " unless it was done by treachery." That is not a mere " might ";
it is denning the law.
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Sr. SULLIVAN No; Este es un nuevo caso citado por él, el 1
Richard II., No. 40. William de Weston debía ser arrastrado y ahorcado,
pero la ejecución fue tranquila; y la ejecución se respiró en el segundo
caso. Entonces: "Y tenga en cuenta, aunque los cargos fueron traición, y posiblemente
"las pruebas probablemente podrían equivaler a eso, y Walsingham, sub anno 1
"Ricardo II., Nos dice que fue hecho por traición; sin embargo, la razón expresada en
"el juicio contra Weston es solo", luego cita el juicio,
y él dice, pasando al pasaje al que quería acercarme, "El
(La verdad es que si fuera entregado por soborno o traición, podría ser
"traición, pero si se entrega por cobardía o imprudencia sin
"traición" por pura sugerencia que hice, fue una investigación
en el método de entrega del castillo "aunque fuera un delito
"contra las leyes de la guerra, y la parte sujeta a una sentencia de muerte por
"ley marcial, como sucedió una vez en un caso de naturaleza similar al final
"tiempos de problemas, sin embargo, no es traición por la ley común, a menos que fuera
"hecho por traición; pero aunque esta oración fue dada en terrorem,
'' Sin embargo, no se ejecutó: aunque parece ser una especie de sentencia militar
"dado en el Parlamento". Ese es el pasaje al que quería referirme.
Sr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE; Esa es una línea muy fuerte, que no
ser "a menos que se haya hecho por traición". Eso no es un mero "poder";
está definiendo la ley.
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Mr. SULLIVAN " The truth is, if it were delivered up by bribery or
" treachery, it might be treason."
Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE; The last sentence you read is what I was
referring to: " Unless it was done by treachery."
Mr. SULLIVAN " Yet it is not treason by the common law, unless
" it was done by treachery; but though this sentence was given in
' ' terrorem, yet it was not executed ; it seems to be a kind of military
" sentence, though given in Parliament."
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Sr. SULLIVAN "La verdad es que si fue entregado por soborno o
"traición, podría ser traición".Sr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE; La última oración que leíste es lo que era refiriéndose a: "A menos que se haya hecho por traición". Sr. SULLIVAN "Sin embargo, no es traición por el derecho consuetudinario, a menos que "fue hecho por traición; pero aunque esta oración fue dada en '' terrorem, sin embargo, no fue ejecutado; parece ser una especie de militar "sentencia, aunque dada en el Parlamento". |
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE That means if it was surrendered by reason
of cowardice or imprudence, then it would not be treason at common
law, or might not be, whichever phrase you choose to adopt; but if, on
the other hand, it was surrendered by reason of bribery or treachery,
that would be treason. Is not that the effect of it?
Mr. SULLIVAN I submit not. I submit, when you read the whole
passage, he really is not dealing with the question of adhering outside the
realm at all, and is simply dealing with these two cases, and establishing
nothing with regard to the statute or the common law, and he simply
passes from them dismissing them as military sentences, throwing no
light one way or the other.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE That is an observation which is justified, I
think, in my opinion, so far as it relates to surrendering the castle of
the King by reason of cowardice or imprudence; but it is not justified
if it relates to the .surrender of the castle by reason of bribery or treachery ;
he seems to draw that very distinction. He says cowardice and imprudence
is not treachery, but military law.
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EL JEFE DE JUSTICIA JEFE Eso significa que si fue entregado por la razón
de cobardía o imprudencia, entonces no sería traición en común ley, o podría no ser, la frase que elija adoptar; pero si, en por otro lado, se entregó por soborno o traición, eso sería traición. ¿No es ese el efecto? Sr. SULLIVAN, no lo presento. Presento, cuando lees todo pasaje, realmente no está tratando con la cuestión de adherirse fuera del reino en absoluto, y simplemente está tratando con estos dos casos, y estableciendo nada con respecto al estatuto o al derecho consuetudinario, y él simplemente pasa de ellos descartándolos como sentencias militares, sin arrojar luz de una manera u otra. EL SEÑOR JUSTICIA PRINCIPAL Esa es una observación justificada, yo creo, en mi opinión, en lo que se refiere a la rendición del castillo de el rey por cobardía o imprudencia; pero no está justificado si se relaciona con la rendición del castillo por soborno o traición; él parece dibujar esa misma distinción. Dice cobardía e imprudencia. no es traición, sino derecho militar. |
Mr. SULLIVAN The opening statement, where one expects to find the
most definite opinion, if definite opinion exist, is " The truth is, if it
" was delivered up by bribery or treachery." That is the extreme case;
it might be treason.
Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE Supposing treason was not known outside
the realm, it seems a funny sort of dissertation ; he is dealing with giving
up a castle outside the realm, and it seems, to my mind, a very large
order to have this alternative put if the law was that there was no such
thing as treason outside the realm.
Mr. SULLIVAN What I am dealing with is, you will always have to
come back to Lord Coke's authority to find the substance of the doctrine
of treason outside the realm. Apparently Lord Coke thought it required
authority to support it, and, my lord, I cite page 168 of Hale to the effect
that these cases of the delivery of castles by their military custodians
are not cases on the statute, and therefore are not authorities. The cases
at all events are not authorities on the matter that I am dealing with.
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Sr. SULLIVAN La declaración de apertura, donde se espera encontrar el
la opinión más definida, si existe una opinión definitiva, es "La verdad es que si
"fue entregado por soborno o traición". Ese es el caso extremo;
Puede ser traición.
Sr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE Suponiendo que la traición no fuera conocida afuera
En el ámbito, parece una curiosa disertación; él está tratando de dar
arriba de un castillo fuera del reino, y parece, en mi opinión, un gran
para tener esta alternativa puesta si la ley era que no existía
cosa como traición fuera del reino.
Sr. SULLIVAN Con lo que estoy tratando es que siempre tendrá que
volver a la autoridad de Lord Coke para encontrar la sustancia de la doctrina
de traición fuera del reino. Aparentemente Lord Coke pensó que requería
autoridad para apoyarlo, y, mi señor, cito la página 168 de Hale al respecto
que estos casos de entrega de castillos por parte de sus custodios militares
no son casos en el estatuto, y por lo tanto no son autoridades. Los casos
en todo caso, no son autoridades sobre el asunto que estoy tratando.
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Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE Had not you better read the next passage;
that is one of the difficulties I feel in your way; the statute of Henry
11 touching the trial of foreign treason, viz., adhering to the King's
"enemies, as also for compassing the King's death without the kingdom,
" at this day the statutes of 35 Henry VIII., chapter 2, hath sufficiently
" provided for it."
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE It is under the statute this jurisdiction
arises.
Mr. SULLIVAN I have not come to the statute of Henry VIII., but
on the passage I cite in my submission, until you have the statute of
Henry VIII. the matter would be pure speculation only, because there
could not be crimes for which the man could not be tried. If the authority
in Dyer is correct, which apparently he suggests, the statute of Henry VIII.
provides for the trial.
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Sr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE ¿No sería mejor que leyera el siguiente pasaje;
esa es una de las dificultades que siento en tu camino; el estatuto de Henry
11 tocar el juicio de traición extranjera, a saber, adherirse a la del Rey
"enemigos, como también para enfrentar la muerte del Rey sin el reino,
"en este día los estatutos de 35 Enrique VIII., capítulo 2, tiene suficiente
"provisto para ello".
EL JEFE DE JUSTICIA SEÑOR Está bajo el estatuto de esta jurisdicción
surge
Sr. SULLIVAN No he llegado al estatuto de Enrique VIII., Pero
en el pasaje que cito en mi presentación, hasta que tenga el estatuto de
Enrique VIII. el asunto sería pura especulación solamente, porque hay
no podían ser crímenes por los cuales el hombre no podía ser juzgado. Si la autoridad
en Dyer es correcto, lo que aparentemente sugiere, el estatuto de Enrique VIII.
prevé el juicio.
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Mr. JUSTICE AVORY Was not an English subject who committed
murder abroad triable in this country if he came back? Mr. SULLIVAN I think not, my lord, at common law; I think the old difficulty of venue existed; that is my impression reading it, though a the moment I cannot give the answer on the book. |
Mr. JUSTICE AVORY No fue un sujeto de inglés quien cometió
asesinato en el extranjero confiable en este país si regresó?
Sr. SULLIVAN Creo que no, mi señor, en el derecho consuetudinario; Creo que el viejo
existía dificultad de lugar; esa es mi impresión al leerlo, aunque en
por el momento no puedo dar la respuesta en el libro.
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Mr. JUSTICE AVORT I think you will find authority for the proposition
he can be tried, and if he can be tried the Court probably found some
way out of the difficulty about venue.
Mr. SULLIVAN At the moment I am under the impression that, until
some statutory provision was made, the common law took no cognisance
of what a man did on territory that did not belong to the common law.
I will have to cite, when I come to deal with The King v. Vaughan,
and other cases of that type, authorities that the common law had no
cognisance even of crimes committed within the realm, where the portion
of the realm within which they were committed was outside the common
law jurisdiction; it was to remedy that that one of the statutes was
passed; there are two statutes of Henry VIII., the 28 Henry VIII. is on
and the 35 Henry VIII. is the other.
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Sr. JUSTICE AVORT Creo que encontrará autoridad para la propuesta.
puede ser juzgado, y si puede ser juzgado, el Tribunal probablemente encontró algunos
lejos de la dificultad sobre el lugar.
Sr. SULLIVAN En este momento tengo la impresión de que, hasta
se hicieron algunas disposiciones legales, el derecho consuetudinario no tuvo conocimiento
de lo que un hombre hizo en un territorio que no pertenecía al common law.
Tendré que citar, cuando llegue a tratar con The King v. Vaughan,
y otros casos de ese tipo, las autoridades que el derecho consuetudinario no tenía
conocimiento incluso de crímenes cometidos dentro del reino, donde la porción
del ámbito en el que se cometieron estaba fuera de lo común
jurisdicción legal; fue para remediar que uno de los estatutos era
pasado Hay dos estatutos de Enrique VIII., el 28 Enrique VIII. Está encendido
y los 35 Henry VIII. Es el otro.
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The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE The 35 Henry VIII. we shall have to look
at. Before you leave Hale there is a passage which seems to have a
very direct bearing upon the point we are discussing at page 169; I do
not think it has been read: " Touching the trial of high treason/'
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El SEÑOR JUSTICIA PRINCIPAL Los 35 Enrique VIII. tendremos que mirar
a. Antes de salir de Hale hay un pasaje que parece tener un
relación muy directa con el punto que estamos discutiendo en la página 169; hago
No creo que se haya leído: "Tocando el juicio de alta traición / '
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Mr. SULLIVAN Mr. Justice Horridge read that just now.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE But I want the last part of it: " Touching
the trial of foreign treason, viz., adhering to the King's enemies, as
also for compassing the King's death without the kingdom, at this day
the statutes of 35 Henry VIII., chapter 2, hath sufficiently provided for
it." This passage I want to call your attention to : " But at common
law he might have been indicted in any county of England, and especially
where the offender's lands lie, if he have any." The authority for that
is the 5 Richard II. If that is right, it gives authority for the trial
for foreign treason in any county, particularly in a county where
offender's lands lie.
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Sr. SULLIVAN El Sr. Juez Horridge lo leyó hace un momento.
El SEÑOR JUSTICIA PRINCIPAL Pero quiero la última parte de ella: "Tocar el juicio de traición extranjera, a saber, adherirse a los enemigos del Rey, como también por comparecer la muerte del Rey sin el reino, en este día los estatutos de 35 Enrique VIII, capítulo 2, han previsto suficientemente "Este pasaje al que quiero llamar su atención:" Pero en común ley él podría haber sido acusado en cualquier condado de Inglaterra, y especialmente donde se encuentran las tierras del delincuente, si tiene alguna ". La autoridad para eso es el 5 Richard II. Si eso es correcto, otorga autoridad para el juicio por traición extranjera en cualquier condado, particularmente en un condado donde las tierras del delincuente mienten. |
Mr. SULLIVAN If, in truth, that was supported by the authority given,
that would get over the difficulty I allege.
Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE And it would be inconsistent with what you
tell us is the result of the case in the 2 Dyer.
Mr. SULLIVAN An investigation of the case cited shows it to be
as follows
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE You have considered it. Mr. SULLIVAN Yes. It was the case of a riot at Cambridge in
which the burgesses rioted, and in the course of the riot apparently
made some attack on the colleges, and some attempt to burn their
charters. The case in question is that the burgesses were summoned to
Parliament in respect of the riot occurring in their town, and their towns-
men attempting to burn the records of the University; the burgesses
were summoned to Parliament to show cause why their charter should not
be forfeited.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE Are you suggesting that is the authority
for this proposition in Hale? What has that to do with foreign treason?
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Sr. SULLIVAN Si, en verdad, eso fue respaldado por la autoridad otorgada,
eso superaría la dificultad que alego.
Sr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE Y sería inconsistente con lo que usted
Cuéntanos es el resultado del caso en el 2 Dyer.
Sr. SULLIVAN Una investigación del caso citado muestra que es
como sigue
EL SEÑOR JUSTICIA PRINCIPAL Lo has considerado.
Sr. SULLIVAN Sí. Fue el caso de un motín en Cambridge en
que los burgueses se amotinaron, y en el curso de los disturbios aparentemente
atacó a las universidades y algunos intentaron quemar sus
Charters El caso en cuestión es que los burgueses fueron convocados a
Parlamento con respecto a los disturbios que ocurren en su ciudad, y sus ciudades
hombres que intentan quemar los registros de la universidad; los burgueses
fueron convocados al Parlamento para mostrar porque su carta no debería
ser perdido
EL SEÑOR JUSTICIA PRINCIPAL ¿Estás sugiriendo que esa es la autoridad
para esta proposición en Hale? ¿Qué tiene eso que ver con la traición extranjera?
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Mr. SULLIVAN My colleague, Professor Morgan, has investigated
every one of these more ancient cases, and he returns me this extract of
the case cited, and if there is some other case, I can only say it is not
this one.
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Sr. SULLIVAN Mi colega, el profesor Morgan, ha investigado
cada uno de estos casos más antiguos, y él me devuelve este extracto de
el caso citado, y si hay algún otro caso, solo puedo decir que no es
éste.
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The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE It seems to me miles away from the point;
it is not like Sir Matthew Hale.
Mr. SULLIVAN Is not this a justification for Stephen's Commentary
on Coke, at page 57, that passages in the Third Institute are often entirely
unwarranted by the authorities which he quotes for them?
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE It is a novel proposition to say that because
Stephen commented severely on Coke, that therefore we are to take
the same comment as made on Sir Matthew Hale.
Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE That cannot be the case; there must be some
mistake about that.
Mr. SULLIVAN I agree; it does seem to me a transference to an
object that was not within the original ambit of the statute. I quite
forgot it was Hale I had open before me.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL I have sent for that particular case. My
learned friend will allow me to point out it may or may not be the
ground of the comment made by the learned author, Hale, but the
advocate who appeared for the Crown said, in Gallon's case, " If a
" man be adherent to the King's enemies in France, his land is forfeitable,
" and his treason shall be tried where his land is, as has been oftentimes
"done in respect of the adherence to the King's enemies in Scotland."
That was said in the course of the argument.
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JEFE DE JUSTICIA DEL SEÑOR Me parece a kilómetros de distancia;
No es como Sir Matthew Hale.
Sr. SULLIVAN ¿No es esto una justificación para el comentario de Stephen?
en Coca-Cola, en la página 57, que los pasajes en el Tercer Instituto a menudo son enteramente
injustificado por las autoridades que él cita para ellos?
EL JEFE DE JUSTICIA DEL SEÑOR Es una propuesta novedosa decir eso porque
Stephen comentó severamente sobre Coke, que por lo tanto debemos tomar
el mismo comentario que hizo sobre sir Matthew Hale.
Sr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE Ese no puede ser el caso; debe haber alguna
error al respecto
Sr. SULLIVAN, estoy de acuerdo; me parece una transferencia a un
objeto que no estaba dentro del ámbito original del estatuto. tranquilo
olvidé que era a Hale lo que había abierto antes que yo.
El ABOGADO GENERAL que he enviado para ese caso en particular. Mi
amigo aprendido me permitirá señalar que puede o no ser el
fundamento del comentario hecho por el sabio autor, Hale, pero el
El abogado que apareció por la Corona dijo, en el caso de Gallon, "Si un
"el hombre se adhiera a los enemigos del Rey en Francia, su tierra es perdible,
"y su traición será juzgada donde está su tierra, como ha sido a menudo
"Hecho con respecto a la adhesión a los enemigos del Rey en Escocia".
Eso se dijo en el curso de la discusión.
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The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE What
do you mean by Gallon's case?
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL That is the case referred to.
Mr. SULLIVAN It was the case of the burgesses of Cambridge.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL I have sent for it.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE It does seem so strange, though it may
be so, that in those days when there was so much happening abroad in
which the Kings of England were interested, that it should not have
been treason to commit the act in France, but treason if committed in
England.
Mr. SULLIVAN Is the reference right, the 5 Richard II., trial 54?
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL That is Peter Gallon's case.
Mr. SULLIVAN How there came to be discussion on the law of treason
in the case I referred to I do not know. The case was looked up on
the Roll of Parliament.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL I understand it is reported in Fitzherbert's
Abridgment. I only happen to know of the case because I have the
reference in the passage to the argument of the representative of the
Crown.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I know there is a reference to it in Fitz-
herbert's Abridgment. We will see what the case is.
Mr. SULLIVAN We may perhaps have looked at the wrong case.
Sir Matthew Hale is more likely to be right than we are. My friends
got it from the Rolls of Parliament, and apparently the reference is at
all events consistent with the Rolls of Parliament. There may be a mis-
apprehension about it. Hale introduces some new cases. Stephen's
Commentary on Hale at page 62 ia that he is too fond of repeating Coke
literally and ignoring his mistakes. That is what Stephen says about
Hale. Hale quotes three cases from the Close Roll, namely, 6 John,
membrane 19; 7 Edward III., part 1, membrane 15 and membrane 9.
They are all prior to the statute, The first is apparently throwing little
light on the subject, because it deals with the confiscation of the lands of
the barons who renounced their allegiance to King John in Normandy.
We are all familiar with the disputes that were going on in Normandy
as to who was the King of Normandy; the position of a baron in those'
days must have been a somewhat difficult one, not from the dual alliance
but the dual claims of his alliance, and they fought out their battles over
his body. The barons in Normandy who acknowledged fealty to the
wrong lord had their lands forfeited in the reign of John. This is before
the Act, and it does not throw much light on the subject we are dis-
cussing here, and would, perhaps, involve considerable investigation on
feudal law.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I am very loath to interrupt or to inter-
fere with your argument, because it is obviously based upon a very
complete research, but the difficulty is we must at some time come to
more modern times, and the law laid down there. You see these matters
have been discussed, and although it may be true that Lord Coke went
further than he was justified in going, still if you find that later authori-
ties have adopted that view, and that there is a judicial authority for it,
even though it does not actually decide the case, it is asking much of us
to ask us to decide that Lord Coke was wrong.
Mr. SULLIVAN If I submit there has been no case decided on it The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE Not on the express point. Mr. SULLIVAN If, asi I submit, this is a case of first impression, so
far as the decisions upon it go, by any Court of justice affecting either
person or property
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE Is that quite right? Mr. SULLIVAN I say if it is. The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I do not follow. You will tell me directly
when you come to it how there could be a, conviction in Lynch's case if
the present argument is right. Lynch was indicted for treason in South
Africa.
Mr. SULLIVAN I am going to deal with Lynch's case, in which the
case was allowed to go to the jury, but I preferred to deal with the
authorities there cited.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I do not want to take you to Lynch's case at
once unless it is convenient. I doubt whether we serve any useful purpose
by looking too much into these earlier authorities when we have to deal
with modern times and the law that binds us now.
Mr. SULLIVAN I am sorry your lordship did not express any desire
beforehand that it might be- most necessary to deal with The King v.
Lynch. That is reported in 1903 King's Bench at page 444. In the Law
Reports, report of The King v. Lynch, this point is not reported.
The ATTORNEY-GENERAL Yes, at page 446. Mr. SULLIVAN There was a motion to quash the indictment. The ATTORNEY-GENERAL On this ground? Mr. SULLIVAN On this ground, but your lordship sees that there is simply a very short argument given, and the only decision of the Court is upon a matter of procedure ; that is why I originally called attention to it ; the only judgment of the Court is not upon the point we are considering, but solely on the question of procedure whether the indictment should
be quashed.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I do* not know whether you have had the
opportunity of reading the long argument upon it.
Mr. SULLIVAN Yes, I have, from the shorthand notes. Mr. JUSTICE AVORT The point was repeated on the conclusion of the
case for the prosecution.
Mr. SULLIVAN I shall have to trespass, again and borrow the shorthand
notes of The King v. Lynch.
Mr. JUSTICE AVORT You will find on the conclusion of the case for
the prosecution the argument was really put before the Court ; it was quite
shortly put at the earlier stage.
Mr. SULLIVAN So I noticed. The argument comes at page 107 of
the shorthand notes, and is continued on page 108. There is an authority
cited Maclane's case and Smith O'Brien's case and the observation of
Mr. Justice' Finucane is stated later on, namely, that the adherence is
imputed to the person charged, not to the place of the offence. The
important matter to> show what was in the mind of the Court is the manner
in which Lord Alverstone dealt with The King v. Vaugha/n at page 109
" It seems to me that The King v. Vaughcm is a. direct authority against
" you ; it is in the 13 State Trials, and the passage is at page 525 and page
t( 526. I have no doubt you have looked at this most carefully. There
" are passages in Hale and others that are against this contention. They
" may be the relics of a barbaric age, but you have to deal with them/ 5
There is an observation further up on the same page by the Lord
Chief Justice " I have no doubt you have considered it, but it seems to
" me that The King v. Vaughan is a direct authority. The charge against
" the prisoner is left to the jury upon the count only of adhering to the
tl King's enemies, that being done upon the high seas, and the point is then
" attempted to be taken that he was not a British subject at all." The
Attorney-General calls attention to the fact that there is no count for
compassing, as the counsel for the defendant had suggested, and then the
Lord Chief Justice says, " It seems to me The King v. Vaughan is a
" direct authority against you." Then he says, " I have no doubt you have
" looked at it most carefully ; there are passages in Hale and others that are
" against this contention. They may be the relics of a barbaric age, but
*' you have to deal with them."
Then there is a quotation from Hale. The argument of the Attorney-
General commences at the bottom of page 111. And he says, " I men-
tioned a statute which was passed in the eighteenth year of George II.
" which related to the case of a, certain number of English subjects who had,
" while this country was engaged in war with Spain, taken commissions from
"the Spanish Government and been guilty of buccaneering and piracy in
" the West Indies. The statute was passed to remove any doubt that these
"persons might be tried for piracy although the act that they had com-
" mitted was also one of high treason. I shall just read the words of the
"statute." I will deal with the statute in one moment. He cites the
dictum, because he admits it is no more, of Mr. Justice Willes, in advising
the Lords in Mulcahy's case ; that is clearly a dictum, and no more.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I think that is quite right; it was not necessary for the decision, but that was the opinion of all the judges. It
was the opinion of the judges delivered to the House of Lords in Mulcahy ? s
case, and they construed the language of the statute of 1351 contrary to
your present argument.
Mr. SULLIVAN In the summary of the argument in the House of Lords
it would appear he said at the bottom of page 317 " By the statute of
" 25 Edward III., statute 5, chapter 2 (extended to Ireland by Poyning's
" Act, see O'Brien v. The Queen), it was declared to be treason." Then he
purports to quote the words of the statute " When a man doth compass or
" imagine the death of our Lord the King," &o., " or if a, man do levy war
11 against our Lord the King in his realm or by adhering to the King's
" enemies in his realm or elsewhere and thereof he probably attainted of
"open deed." He purports to quote the words of the statute because it
is in inverted commas. It was a dictum pure and simple ; the case of The
Queen v. Mulcdhy had nothing to say to treason without the realm at all;
the point that went to the House of Lords did not involve that question.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE I think you are quite justified in saying
that.
Mr. SULLIVAN The case is reported in 3 English and Irish appeal
oases at common law, and the decision in the Court below, apart from
this question of the jury, and the only matter of argument in the Court
below, was whether a man could commit an act in Dublin when not in
Dublin himself to commit it, it being proved it was done by a member of
the Corporation of which he was proved to be one.
Mr. JUSTICE HOBRIDGE I have not the copy of Lynch/s trial in the
shorthand notes, but I have The Times Law Reports, and it seems that the
point was not only taken, in the first instance, before plea, but was taken
afterwards at the close of the case.
Mr. SULLIVAN At that time the argument was developed. Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE Whether rightly or wrongly, the Lord Chief
Justice must have decided the point by leaving the issue to the jury.
Mr. SULLIVAN He did, on the authority of The King v. Vaughtm,
which the Lord Chief Justice more than once repeats is conclusive and
decisive on the subject; and if he was right in that, and if The King v.
Vaughan that he purports to follow is conclusive on the subject, I could not
hope to convince your lordships after this lapse of time, and your lordships,
in this Court at all events, would follow the same precedent. Now let me
take The King v. Vaughan, which is reported in the 13 State Trials.
Mr. JUSTICE AVORT It is also reported in 2 Salkeld. Mr. SULLIVAN I am reading at column 487 ; that will give your
lordship the indictment for the trial of Captain Thomas Vaughan. It was
an indictment tried before Sir Charles Hedges, judge of the High Court of
Admiralty, the Lord Chief Justice Holt, the Lord Chief Justice Treby, the
Lord Chief Baron Ward, Mr. Justice Turton, and others of His Majesty's
Commissioners!. It was tried before the Lord High Admiral and the other
persons that were mentioned in the statute that I will have to open to
your lordships, as showing conclusively that it was tried in respect of acts
done within the realm of England, though not within the jurisdiction of the
common law.
Mr. JUSTICE AVORT Surely that was a trial under a special Com-
mission.
Mr. SULLIVAN It was presided over by the judge of the High Court
of Admiralty.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE And Lord Chief Justice Holt. Mr. SULLIVAN Yes. I suggest that since the President of the Court
was the Admiralty judge, that shows it was tried under a statute which I
will pass to, and I will show that the judge of Admiralty and divers other
weighty persons, that were construed to mean Her Majesty's judges, sat
with him under the statute of 28 Henry VIII.
The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE There is no doubt whatever it was an
indictment for high treason on the high seas.
Mr. SULLIVAN It was an indictment for high treason within the
realm, as I will show your lordship; it was on the narrow seas. I will
show that at that date there was no doubt or question that the place
where the acts were committed was within the realm of England. The
date of the trial is in 1696, and in 1696 to doubt the realm of England
extended to the narrow seas would itself be such an act as might have
been extremely dangerous to a century earlier. I am reading two-thirds
down column 488. The prisoner was indicted for " being then on the
" high seas, within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England, about
" 14 leagues from Deal, did then and there by force and arms falsely,
" maliciously, and traitorously aid and help and assist the enemies of our
" said Lord the King." That is the first count. The second is of great
importance : ' ' As a false traitor against our said Lord the King further
" designing, practising, and with his whole strength intending the common
" peace of trapquility of this kingdom of England to disturb," an offence,
observe, ayfm&i the common peace of the kingdom, <( and a war and
" rebeli^fi against the said King upon the high seas within the juris-
11 dictifn%of the Admiralty of England to move, stir up, and procure;
" and the said Lord the King, from the title, honour, royal name, and
" imperial crown of his kingdom of England, and dominions upon the
" high seas, to depose and deprive; and miserable slaughter of the sub-
" jects of the said Lord the King, and this kingdom of England, upon
" the high seas, and within the jurisdiction aforesaid, to cause and pro-
" cure; on the said 8th day of July, in the said seventh year of the King,
" upon the high seas, about 14 leagues from Deal, and within the
" dominion of the Crown of England, and within the jurisdiction of the
" Admiralty of England aforesaid "; then with other traitors war against
the King he levied and waged; he levied and waged war.
Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE It was not upon a British vessel, was it? I
do not gather that; it was on a French vessel; it was not within the
theory that an English ship is a portion of the Dominions?
Mr. SULLIVAN No. Mr. JUSTICE HORRIDGE It is laid as within the Admiralty jurisdic-
tion. The " Franconia " showed us that the ordinary Admiralty juris-
diction was not, at any rate, beyond the three-mile limit, and this was 14
leagues from Deal; the facts were that it was not on a British ship, and
it was levied outside the Admiralty jurisdiction.
| The LORD CHIEF JUSTICE
|
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